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INTERPRETING CONTRACTS  
WITHOUT CONTEXT 
JOHN F. COYLE* AND W. MARK C. WEIDEMAIER** 
Contracts always present questions of interpretation. This is nothing new.  
What is new is the concern that courts lack the tools to resolve many of these 
questions.  When text is unclear, courts look to context, examining extrinsic 
evidence for clues as to what the parties intended.  But what if there is no 
evidence of context?  Some contract theorists worry about these contractual 
“black holes” based on two assumptions.  First, that ostensibly standard 
clauses may vary in ways that have escaped the notice of transaction 
participants and other market actors.  Second, that contract law’s usual 
interpretive tools cannot help courts decide whether to assign different 
meanings to different versions of a clause.  If true, opportunistic parties 
might exploit textual variation to achieve unexpected results. 
This Article critically evaluates these assumptions.  Drawing on multiple, 
hand-coded samples of commercial contracts, we first document widespread 
and problematic variance in ostensibly standardized choice-of-law and 
arbitration clauses.  This finding provides empirical support for the concern 
about contractual black holes.  We push back, however, against the claim 
that contract law must change to accommodate these findings. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Contracts always present questions of interpretation. This is nothing 
new.  One of contract law’s most important functions is to resolve 
interpretive problems created by the use of imprecise or unclear 
language.1  In the usual case, the text is unclear, but there will be some 
contextual evidence—in the form of prior drafts, statements made 
during negotiations, course of dealing and performance, or usage of 
trade—to help clarify the parties’ intent.2  The search for evidence to 
                                               
 1.See Shawn Bayern, Contract Meta-Interpretation, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1097, 1099 
(2016) (noting that interpretive questions are the “core questions” of contract law). 
 2. See infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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put the parties’ intentions into proper context is fundamental to 
contract interpretation.  Indeed, contract law is centrally defined by 
the tension created by this search, which pits the desire to honor the 
contract’s text against the recognition that, without an understanding 
of context, a court may misconstrue the parties’ intentions.3 
Recently, however, some scholars have raised a different concern:  the 
absence of contextual evidence may leave courts without tools to resolve 
common interpretive problems.4  Assume, for example, that after principal 
negotiators have sketched the outlines of a deal, their lawyers document 
the transaction by using a contract from a previous transaction as a 
template.  The lawyers may assume that the clauses in this template were 
carefully honed in prior transactions.  Or perhaps they assume that many 
of the clauses are boilerplate and, even if imperfectly drafted, must remain 
constant from transaction to transaction.  In either case, neither the lawyers 
nor their principals may pay any heed to many parts of the contract. 
If contracts were indeed standardized and well-understood by market 
participants, this inattentiveness would pose few problems.5  For example, 
even if the parties and their lawyers gave no thought to a clause, evidence 
of trade usage can clarify its meaning.6  But what if contracts are not 
standardized?  Lawyers are famous tinkerers with contract language.7  A 
change introduced by one lawyer, perhaps intended merely to clarify rather 
than change the meaning, may pass unnoticed into other contracts.8  
Consequently, an ostensibly “standard” clause may vary from contract to 
contract.  In a dispute, a party that discovers such a discrepancy may claim, 
opportunistically, that the contract has an unexpected meaning.9 
                                               
 3. On the debate between textualism and contextualism in contract interpretation, see, 
e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel, & Robert E. Scott, Text and Context:  Contract Interpretation 
as Contract Design, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 23, 25–28 (2014); Bayern, supra note 1, at 1099–1100. 
 4. For recent scholarship motivated by this problem, see Stephen J. Choi, Mitu 
Gulati, & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in Commercial Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 
1 (2017); and the associated commentary in Duke Law Journal Online, Lisa Bernstein, 
Black Hole Apparitions, 67 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 102 (2017); and Douglas G. Baird, Pari Passu 
Clauses and the Skeuomorph Problem in Contract Law, 67 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 84 (2017). 
 5. See Bayern, supra note 1. 
 6. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-303 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (“The 
measure and background for interpretation are set by the commercial context, which 
may explain and supplement even the language of a formal or final writing.”). 
 7. See, e.g., W. Mark C. Weidemaier et al., Origin Myths, Contracts, and the Hunt for 
Pari Passu, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 72, 95–96 (2013). 
 8. See infra notes 33–35 and accompanying text. 
 9. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Robert E. Scott, Contractual Arbitrage, in 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INT’L GOVERNANCE 1 (Eric Brousseau et al. eds., 2017)  
[hereinafter Contractual Arbitrage]. 
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Contract theory is increasingly focused on this danger.10  As an 
empirical matter, however, it is not clear the concern is warranted.11  
How often do contracts create these interpretive problems, where 
courts must assign meaning to text without helpful contextual 
evidence about what the contracting parties intended?  The literature 
to date has mostly examined this question by focusing on an arguably 
idiosyncratic clause in an arguably idiosyncratic contract:  the pari passu 
clause in sovereign debt contracts.12  We examine whether clauses routinely 
found in ordinary commercial agreements also generate interpretive 
disputes that cannot be placed into meaningful context.13 
We find that they do.  Specifically, we show that many choice-of-law 
clauses and arbitration clauses—boilerplate provisions that are 
frequently borrowed wholesale from other agreements—present 
interpretive challenges to courts.  Without contextual information as to 
the meaning of the clause, what are judges to do?  We explore several 
possible answers, each imperfect in its own right: (1) considering 
evidence about how contracts are produced and selected; (2) asking 
whether different versions of the disputed clause are priced differently; and 
(3) giving weight to surveys and other evidence of majoritarian preference.  
Although lawyers rarely attempt to introduce evidence of this sort, we do 
not think contract law forbids it.14  The practice of litigating contract 
disputes, like the practice of contract drafting, can be standardized and slow 
to innovate.15  If “acontextual” contracts are a problem, the answer is not, 
or not necessarily, to change contract law.  Instead, the answer may lie in 
changing the way lawyers litigate contract cases. 
                                               
 10. See Choi, Gulati, & Scott, supra note 4. 
 11. See id. at 6–8. 
 12. See infra notes 47–51 and accompanying text; see also NML Capital, Ltd. v. 
Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 257–58 (2d Cir. 2012) (surveying literature discussing 
disputes as to the intended meaning of the pari passu clause). 
 13. See Choi, Gulati, & Scott, supra note 4, at 5. 
 14. Infra Part III.B (describing the evolution of admissibility of consumer survey 
data in modern trial practice); see also Rachel M. Bowe, Comment, The Scope of 
Arbitration Clauses in Collective Bargaining Agreements & Superficial Divide:  Clarifying the 
Circuit Confusion, 31 HAMLINE L. REV. 234, 247 (2008). 
 15. See Hunt Ltd. v. Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc., 889 F.2d 1274, 1277 (1989) 
(stressing that extrinsic evidence is inadmissible when contract terms are unambiguous); 
see also Omri Ben-Shahar & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Interpreting Contracts Via Surveys and 
Experiments, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1753, 1755 n.3 (2017). 
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I.   INTERPRETATION WITHOUT CONTEXT 
A.   The Relevance (and Frequent Absence) of Contractual Intent 
Everyone knows that contracts are incomplete, in that they do not 
describe and discount “all relevant future contingencies . . . with 
respect to both likelihood and futurity.”16  One reason for incompleteness 
is that parties do not have complete presentiation.17  Even if this were 
not so—that is, even if parties could assign a probability and value to 
all possible future states of the world—it would be prohibitively costly 
to negotiate and draft a contract covering such an infinitude of possibilities.18 
Likewise, everyone knows that contracts include ambiguities.19  On 
occasion, this is a design choice.  For instance, parties might choose to 
define their obligations imprecisely, effectively delegating the task of 
adding precision to a later adjudicator.20  Other times, the ambiguity 
may be unintentional, the result of poor drafting or of the inherent 
limitations of language.21  A contract is an attempt to translate the ideas 
underlying a bargain into words.  Much can get lost in this act of 
translation, for ideas are more complex and nuanced than the words 
available to represent them.22 
So:  language is imprecise, lawyers are fallible, and the future involves 
too many contingencies to foresee, much less address, in a contract.  The 
                                               
 16. Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics:  The Governance of Contractual 
Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 236 (1979). 
 17. Ian Macneil defined “presentiation” as “a recognition that the course of the 
future is so unalterably bound by present conditions that the future has been brought 
effectively into the present so that it may be dealt with just as if it were in fact the 
present.”  Ian R. Macneil, Contracts:  Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under 
Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 863 (1978).  
Macneil, of course, was well aware that people do not have complete presentiation.  See 
Ian R. Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentiation, 60 VA. L. REV. 589, 591 
& n.10 (1974). 
 18. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Erin O’Hara O’Connor, Unbundling Procedure:   
Carve-Outs from Arbitration Clauses, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1945, 1954–55 (2014); Michael Klausner, The 
Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law:  A Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 785 (2006). 
 19. See Bayern, supra note 1. 
 20. See Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract 
Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 817 (2006). 
 21. See AM Int’l, Inc. v. Graphic Mgmt. Assocs., Inc., 44 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 
1995) (“Discrepancy between the word and the world is a common source of 
interpretive problems everywhere.”). 
 22. Claire A. Hill, A Comment on Language and Norms in Complex Business Contracting, 
77 CHI. KENT L. REV. 29, 53 (2001) (“[T]he limits of language, too, constrain parties’ 
ability to specify exactly what they want and how they want the law to treat them in 
various circumstances.”). 
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result is that contracts raise innumerable potential interpretive disputes.  
An important function of contract law is to supply tools for resolving 
these disputes.23  To a significant extent, the law does this by attempting 
to uncover the parties’ ex ante intentions.24  Thus, if the courts are 
persuaded that the parties had a common intention with regard to the 
meaning of a clause, the court will assign it this shared meaning, 
however idiosyncratic it might be.25 
In most cases, it is difficult or impossible to recover the parties’ 
subjective intent with perfect accuracy.26  For this reason, even when 
ostensibly concerned with subjective intent, courts tend to favor 
evidentiary proxies that are objective in nature.27  Effectively, this 
means that courts assign to each party’s behavior the meaning 
reasonably understood by its counter-party.28  We recognize and intend 
this as a generalization.29  As we have noted, the tension between subjectivist 
and objectivist approaches to interpretation is fundamental to contract law 
and theory.30  But it is broadly correct to say (1) that the primary 
                                               
 23. Bayern, supra note 1, at 1099. 
 24. See Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc., 780 N.E.2d 166, 170 (N.Y. 2002) (“The 
fundamental, neutral precept of contract interpretation is that agreements are 
construed in accord with the parties’ intent.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 201 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“[T]he primary search is for a common meaning 
of the parties . . . .”); infra note 31, at 1–2. 
 25. See, e.g., TKO Equip. Co. v. C&G Coal Co., 863 F.2d 541, 545 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(“[P]arties, like Humpty Dumpty, may use words as they please. If they wish the 
symbols ‘one Caterpillar D9G tractor’ to mean ‘500 railroad cars full of watermelons,’ 
that’s fine—provided parties share this weird meaning.”); Garza v. Marine Transp. 
Lines, Inc., 861 F.2d 23, 27 n.4 (2d Cir. 1988) (“There is nothing in the law of contracts 
that prevents the parties from ascribing an uncommon meaning to their words.”). 
 26. See Bayern, supra note 1, at 1128. 
 27. See Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism:  The Regulatory Role of 
Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697, 723 (1990) (“Ordinary or reasonable 
meaning is relevant to, although not dispositive of, the question of shared subjective 
meaning.”) (quotations omitted); Bayern, supra note 1, at 1128 (noting the difficulty 
in determining the parties’ subjective intentions); cf. Lawrence M. Solan, Contract as 
Agreement, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 353, 368 (2007) (“[S]peech acts all contain 
inferences of the speaker’s intent.”). 
 28. See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 27, at 723–24. 
 29. Contract law embraces contradictory principles, most notably the conflict 
“between protecting reasonable expectations based on promise while simultaneously 
preserving a more subjectively conceived freedom of choice.”  William C. Whitford, 
Ian Macneil’s Contribution to Contracts Scholarship, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 545, 548 n.11. 
 30. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.  For examples, see Alan Schwartz and 
Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926 (2010); Shawn J. Bayern, 
Rational Ignorance, Rational Close-Mindedness, and Modern Economic Formalism in Contract 
Law, 97 CAL. L. REV. 943 (2009); Braucher, supra note 27; Solan, supra note 27. 
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articulated goal of contract interpretation is to divine the parties’ ex 
ante intentions,31 and (2) that, especially when the text of a written 
contract is unclear, courts examine contextual evidence for clues 
about “what individual parties wanted (or what reasonable parties in 
their circumstances would have wanted).”32 
But what if the parties did not intend, or act as if they intended, 
anything?  Creating a written contract can be a routine, even automated, 
process.33  At best, lawyers start with a standard form contract and 
carefully modify it to suit the client’s needs.34  To take a dimmer view of 
legal practice, lawyers may also engage in “editorial churning”—that is, 
making ad hoc and largely cosmetic changes to the template from a 
prior deal.35  The process creates a second, slightly different template, 
which might or might not become the template for yet a third deal.36  
This iterative process can spawn a multiplicity of templates across and 
within firms.  And when the time comes to prepare documents for a new 
deal, lawyers may lack the time or inclination to make an informed choice 
about which to use.37  It may be that no informed choice is possible.  In 
many cases, no precedential judicial opinion will clarify whether one 
version of the clause means something different from any other.38 
It follows that parties do not always negotiate, or even contemplate, 
the subject matter addressed by each clause in the contract.  Some 
clauses, for instance, just happen to be part of what is regarded as the 
                                               
 31. STEVEN J. BURTON, ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION 1 (2009). 
 32. Bayern, supra note 1, at 1100. 
 33. E.g., Barak Richman, Contracts Meet Henry Ford, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77, 85 
(2011) (asserting that “the efficiency of unthinking mimicry” underlies both 
boilerplate contracts and automobile assembly lines). 
 34. See John Flood, Doing Business:  The Management of Uncertainty in Lawyers’ Work, 
25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 41, 57 (1991). 
 35. See, e.g., Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, The Inefficient Evolution of Merger 
Agreements, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 57, 61 (2017). 
 36. Lawyers are aware of this dynamic, and in fact even use it to explain seeming 
oddities in contract drafting practices.  For example, one popular story seeks to explain 
how a few sovereign bonds issued under New York law in the 1990s incorporated 
collective action clauses, which were then associated with sovereign bonds issued 
under English law.  The story attributes this to accident—positing that the lawyers 
carelessly began with the English-law form.  The story appears to be incorrect, but this 
did not diminish its appeal.  See W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, A People’s History 
of Collective Action Clauses, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 51, 74–80 (2013). 
 37. Anderson & Manns, supra note 35, at 84–85. 
 38. See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 
VA. L. REV. 757, 776 (1995) (“A judicial opinion that interprets one corporation’s 
contract term in effect embeds that interpretation in the contracts of all firms that use 
the same term.”). 
1680 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:1673 
 
“standard” template for this sort of transaction.39  Parties may first 
discover these clauses, and consider their potential meaning(s), long 
after contract formation.  Nor do parties always make intentional 
choices among different versions of a clause.  Even if they discuss the 
broad subject matter covered by the clause, they may wrongly believe 
their discussion implicates standardized options.  To use examples we 
will cover at length later:  parties may agree to arbitrate future disputes, 
or to have their contract governed by a particular state’s law, without 
realizing that the clauses memorializing these choices come in many 
different varieties and that the choice of a contract template can have 
significant consequences.40 
If the parties later disagree about the meaning of a clause produced 
in this manner, one cannot seriously describe the court’s interpretive 
task as a search for the parties’ ex ante intentions.  This is true even 
when intent is examined objectively rather than subjectively.  In such 
cases, the parties neither had, nor behaved as if they had, any intention 
with regard to the meaning of the clause or to how it would apply to 
their present dispute.  Nor can the lawyers provide insight.  Even if the 
lawyers’ intentions are relevant, on the theory that the parties 
delegated the drafting of a particular clause to these agents, the lawyers 
cannot solve the interpretive problem if they did not make a knowing 
choice among templates.  Nor will there often be trade usage or other 
relevant objective evidence, as there may be no widespread commercial 
practice or understanding with regard to the interpretive question.41  To 
use another example we will cover later:  there may not be any prevailing 
view about whether an arbitration agreement necessarily encompasses 
both contract and tort (rather than just contract) claims.42 
B.   “Black Holes” and Other Problematic Clauses 
When contracting parties dispute the meaning of a clause produced in 
this manner, a search for contextual evidence of party intent will turn up 
little of value.  The problem is compounded when lawyers make minor 
                                               
 39. See Choi, Gulati, & Scott, supra note 4, at 4. 
 40. See generally infra note 65 and accompanying text.  For evidence of variance in 
dispute resolution clauses, see W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Customized Procedure in Theory 
and Reality, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1865, 1925–30 (2015). 
 41. See U.C.C. § 1-303(c) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (defining 
usage of trade as “any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of 
observance in a place, vocation, or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be 
observed with respect to the transaction in question”). 
 42. See infra note 136 and accompanying text. 
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changes to the template.  As altered templates diffuse through the 
market, other lawyers may be unaware that they are using version “A” 
of a clause rather than versions “B,” “C,” and so forth.  When disputes 
arise as to the meaning of these clauses, a textually minded judge may 
interpret these versions differently, on the assumption that differences 
in language must mean something.43 
How often do contracts create these interpretive problems?  
Although there is relatively little evidence, the literature suggests that 
contracts may frequently exhibit variation that cannot be explained by 
reference to party intent (even objectively defined).44  In a study of 
merger agreements, Anderson and Manns found a “remarkable level 
of editorial churning,” in which lawyers made extensive and seemingly 
cosmetic changes to deal documents.45  These changes substantially 
increased the median length of merger agreements over time and 
likely resulted in the creation of numerous, different templates even 
within the same law firm.46 
Choi, Gulati, and Scott present similar evidence in a study of the pari 
passu clause in sovereign bond contracts.47  That phrase, meaning “in 
equal step” in Latin, appears in a clause in nearly all sovereign bonds—at 
least those governed by law other than that of the issuing government.48  
The clause typically states that the issuing government will rank its 
obligations to creditors pari passu.49  This has a clear meaning in 
corporate debt, where pari passu-ranking creditors are entitled to a pro 
rata share of liquidation proceeds (after higher priority claims are 
satisfied).50  But the meaning is unclear in the sovereign debt context, 
where there is no bankruptcy court and no liquidation.51 
Choi, Gulati, and Scott document how different versions of the pari 
passu clause evolved and spread through the market, including one 
variation that obliged the issuing government to maintain the equal 
                                               
 43. See Metro. Life Ins. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 906 F.2d 884, 889 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 44. See Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 758–59 (2d Cir. 1946); see also 
supra notes 27–28. 
 45. Anderson & Manns, supra note 35, at 76. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Choi, Gulati, & Scott, supra note 4, at 36–38. 
 48. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier et al., Origin Myths, Contracts, and the Hunt for Pari 
Passu, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 72, 73 (2013). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 74. 
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ranking of its “payment obligations.”52  Over a series of decisions, first 
against Peru in Belgium, and later against Argentina in New York, 
courts interpreted this clause to require that the government pay its 
creditors pro rata.53  Importantly, the court enforced this 
interpretation not through an award of damages—the pari passu 
clause becomes relevant after the government has already defaulted, 
so creditors already are entitled to money damages for the amount of 
the outstanding debt—but through an injunction that forced the 
governments to comply.54 
Many market participants were surprised by these rulings and viewed 
them as unwelcome.55  Relying on archival work, scholars pointed out 
that the pari passu clause has appeared at least occasionally in 
sovereign bonds for two centuries, that the clause had gradually 
become a routine feature of sovereign bond documentation, and that 
lawyers have slowly introduced variations into the clause that serve no 
apparent purpose.56  By seizing on one variation, creditors of Peru and 
Argentina were able to advance a credible, textualist argument that the 
version of the clause used by those countries—the one with the word 
“payment”—meant something that surprised market participants.57 
Choi, Gulati, and Scott characterize the pari passu clause as a 
contractual “black hole.”  By this, they mean that the clause has been 
used in sovereign bonds for so long, and so thoughtlessly, that it has 
been “emptied of any recoverable meaning.”58  Such black holes, they 
say, are utterly devoid of interpretive context:  “The term in question 
can apply to an infinitely wide spectrum of referents . . . because there 
is no basis in the relevant context to determine what, if any, shared 
                                               
 52. See Choi, Gulati, & Scott, supra note 4, at 6 (explaining that this variation 
“required holdout creditors to be paid in full as a condition to the sovereigns paying 
consenting creditors under a restructuring agreement”). 
 53. W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Anna Gelpern, Injunctions in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 
31 YALE J. ON REG. 189 (2014). 
 54. Id. at 195–96. 
 55. See Choi, Gulati, & Scott, supra note 4, at 6. 
 56. See id. at 8. 
 57. See id. at 6. 
 58. Id. at 3–4.  They also invoke the term “grey hole” for clauses for which some 
evidence on the meaning of the contractual term remains, but this evidence may be 
so minimal or contradictory as to leave courts effectively with little guidance on how 
to apply this meaning during litigation.  Id.  Choi, Gulati, and Scott note that such 
clauses raise the same interpretive issues and thus use “black hole” as an umbrella 
term.  Id.  So shall we. 
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meaning exists.”59  The tendency of lawyers to introduce new legal 
jargon to an existing clause—which Choi, Gulati, and Scott term 
“encrustation”—compounds the problem by creating a risk of “litigation 
over essentially meaningless variations in the boilerplate language.”60 
Despite these examples, the question remains:  how often do contracts 
create interpretive problems that cannot be resolved through a search for 
party intent?  In the next Part, we present evidence suggesting that the 
problem is quite common, perhaps endemic.  We look to less exotic 
clauses that routinely appear in commercial contracts.  In so doing, we 
document the widespread use of clauses that share important 
functional characteristics of contractual “black holes.”  That is, the 
clause’s meaning is unclear; the uncertainty cannot be resolved by 
searching for the usual types of contextual evidence; and the clause 
takes slightly different form from contract to contract, which tempts 
courts to assign different meanings to minor textual variations. 
II.    CHOICE-OF-LAW AND ARBITRATION SURPRISES 
Our focus in this Part is on commercial contracts—contracts for the 
provision of goods and services between relatively large business firms.  
We focus on choice-of-law clauses and arbitration clauses.  The former 
designates the legal regime that will govern the parties’ relationship.61  
The latter requires the parties to submit any future disputes to binding 
resolution before a private third party rather than a judge.62  Both 
clauses appear routinely in commercial contracts.63  Drawing on 
                                               
 59. Id. at 9–10.  A quibble:  at times, Choi, Gulati, and Scott appear to lament the 
lack of evidence of the intentions of the very first parties to ever use the clause.  Id. at 
3 n.2 (“[T]he parties’ original understanding of what a clause meant can, in theory, 
be lost entirely by the process of repetition and the insertion of random 
variations . . . .”).  This emphasis on the very first drafters of a clause is consistent with 
views expressed previously by at least two of the authors.  See Stephen J. Choi & Mitu 
Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1153 (2006).  But evidence of this 
sort is essentially irrelevant to contract interpretation—except in the sense that, if we 
knew what the very first users of a clause intended, this might serve as a weak proxy for 
the intent of the parties to this contract.  Of course, evidence of how current market 
participants understand the clause would be better.  In any event, contract law does 
not direct judges to excavate the very first contract to use a clause and to divine the 
meaning of these original users—dead, perhaps, for centuries.  See W. Mark C. 
Weidemaier, Indiana Jones, Contracts Originalist, 9 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 255, 255–56 (2014). 
 60. Choi, Gulati, & Scott, supra note 4, at 3–5. 
 61. See infra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 62. See Drahozal & O’Hara O’Connor, supra note 18, at 1948. 
 63. In a sample of material commercial contracts attached to SEC filings made 
between 2000 and 2012, Weidemaier finds that 95.7% designate the governing law, 
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datasets compiled in our separate work, we demonstrate that clauses 
akin to contractual black holes are commonplace, even in contracts 
involving high stakes and sophisticated parties.64 
Although parties often agree ex ante on whether to arbitrate future 
disputes and on their preferred governing law, their preferences can 
diverge ex post.65  For example, arbitration typically offers less discovery 
than litigation.66  Ex ante, parties might view this as a benefit, hoping 
that by choosing arbitration, they will constrain opportunistic use of 
discovery to impose costs on an adversary.67  Post-dispute, however, one 
party may conclude that it needs extensive discovery to prove its claims, 
or may view the expense of discovery as a source of leverage.68  In such 
a case, the party will have an incentive to try to escape its obligation to 
arbitrate.69  The same dynamic exists for choice-of-law clauses.  If a 
party ultimately concludes that the law of a jurisdiction other than the 
one named in the choice-of-law clause is more favorable, it may try to 
persuade the court to disregard the clause. 
The foregoing discussion presupposes that one party takes a position 
inconsistent with its ex ante intention.  But again, recall that on many 
questions, the parties will not have any ex ante intentions.70  Even if the 
parties broadly agree to arbitrate, or to have their agreement governed 
by the law of a particular state, they will not always consider the 
questions we discuss.  For example, a party to a contract with an 
                                               
while 48.2% provide for arbitration.  Arbitration clauses appear even more frequently 
(61%) in contracts between parties from different countries.  See Weidemaier, supra 
note 40, at 1905–06, 1919. 
 64. Id. at 1905–07. 
 65. See Bruce L. Hay, Procedural Justice—Ex Ante vs. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1803, 
1811–13 (1997). 
 66. See Randy J. Sutton, Annotation, Discovery in Federal Arbitration Proceedings Under 
Discovery Provision of Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C.A. § 7, and Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, as Permitted by Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(6)(B), 45 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 51 (2010) 
(discussing the statutory and procedural bases for the limitation of discovery afforded 
in arbitration proceedings). 
 67. See Drahozal & O’Hara O’Connor, supra note 18, at 1953–54; Weidemaier, 
supra note 40, at 1886. 
 68. Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561, 
603 (2001) (“[T]he bigger the expense to be borne by the opponent, the bigger the 
incentive to make the request.”). 
 69. Party preferences regarding dispute resolution procedures will often change 
once a dispute arises.  See Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Contractualizing Procedure 
13 (Dec. 31, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1323056; see 
also Hay, supra note 65, at 1826–27. 
 70. See supra notes 33–42 and accompanying text. 
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arbitration clause might later argue that the clause applies to contract 
but not tort claims.  The argument is not implausible; that parties 
wanted to arbitrate something need not imply that they wanted to 
arbitrate everything.  And, crucially, a search for shared intent with 
regard to the question will likely turn up nothing of value.  That is true 
even if framed in objective terms.  To invoke evidence of trade usage, 
for instance, a party usually must prove that the usage existed at the 
time of the contract and that both parties knew or should have known 
of it.71  But if participants in the trade rarely give any thought to a 
question, no such proof will be available. 
A.  Disputes About Choice-of-Law Clauses 
Choice-of-law clauses are a staple of modern contract practice.72  They 
provide certainty as to the law that will govern an agreement and make it 
unnecessary for a court to conduct a conflict-of-laws analysis when the dispute 
has a connection to more than one jurisdiction.73  However, they also present 
interpretive challenges.74  In many cases, these clauses are pure boilerplate; 
the parties will not have negotiated the language in the clause other than to 
select the governing jurisdiction.75  Consequently, it is not at all clear that the 
text of the typical clause provides a reliable guide to what the parties 
“intended” with respect to a wide range of issues.76  Nor will the parties always 
                                               
 71. BURTON, supra note 31, at 174. 
 72. See John F. Coyle, The Canons of Construction for Choice-of-Law Clauses, 92 WASH. 
L. REV. 631, 641 (2017). 
 73. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 59 (1995) 
(observing that a “choice-of-law provision, when viewed in isolation, may reasonably be 
[considered] as merely a substitute for the conflict-of-laws analysis that otherwise would 
determine what law to apply to disputes arising out of the contractual relationship”). 
 74. See Coyle, supra note 72, at 635–39; see also PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 
1145 (5th ed. 2010). 
 75. See Glenn West, The Law You Choose to Govern Your Contract May Not Be the Law 
That Governs, WEIL INSIGHTS:  GLOBAL PRIV. EQUITY WATCH (Jan. 12, 2016, 12:26 AM), 
https://privateequity.weil.com/insights/contractual-choice-of-governing-law-and-statutes-
of-limitations-the-law-you-choose-to-govern-your-contract-may-not-be-the-law-that-governs-
the-applicable-statute-of-limitations-for-claims-aris (stating that “most deal professionals 
actually do focus on the law chosen to govern an agreement” but that “there is often less 
focus on the actual wording of the clause that effectuates that choice”). 
 76.   
Construction of a contractual provision is, of course, a matter of discerning the 
parties’ intent[ . . . . ]  We must therefore rely on the contract itself.  But the provision 
of the contract at issue here was not one that these parties drafted themselves.  
Rather, they incorporated portions of a standard form contract commonly used in 
the construction industry.  That makes it most unlikely that their intent was in any 
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have an intention about how the clause should be applied to a particular 
matter. 
When a contracting party believes that the law of the jurisdiction 
named in the choice-of-law clause is unfavorable, that party will often 
try to persuade the court to apply the law of a different jurisdiction.  In 
so doing, it will typically advance one of the following arguments: 
1. The clause only applies to contract claims.  It does not apply to 
the tort or statutory claims being asserted.77 
2. The clause states that it will be “interpreted” or “construed” in 
accordance with the law of a given jurisdiction but leaves 
unanswered the question of which jurisdiction’s law will be 
applied to “govern” the contract.78 
3. The clause only selects the substantive law of the chosen 
jurisdiction.  The rule in question is procedural and therefore 
not covered by the clause.79 
4. The clause selects the whole law of the chosen jurisdiction, 
including its conflicts rules, and these rules require the court to 
apply the law of a different jurisdiction.80 
5. The law of the chosen U.S. state includes federal law.  Federal 
law preempts state law.  The contract is therefore governed by 
federal law rather than the law of the state named in the clause.81 
We characterize each of these arguments as an “escape hatch.”  If a 
party can persuade the court to accept one of these arguments, then it 
may escape the law of the jurisdiction named in the choice-of-law 
clause and have the law of a different jurisdiction applied in its place. 
Importantly, none of the above arguments challenge the basic 
enforceability of a choice-of-law clause.  Instead, these arguments 
require the court to interpret the choice-of-law clause.  In some cases, 
the clause will be drafted so as to foreclose each of the aforementioned 
arguments.  Consider the following comprehensive clause: 
                                               
way at variance with the purposes for which choice-of-law clauses are commonly 
written and the manner in which they are generally interpreted. 
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 488 
(1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 77. See Krock v. Lipsay, 97 F.3d 640, 645 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 78. See Boat Town U.S.A., Inc. v. Mercury Marine Div. of Brunswick Corp., 364 So. 
2d 15, 17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). 
 79. See W. Video Collectors, L.P. v. Mercantile Bank, 935 P.2d 237, 239 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997). 
 80. See Weiss v. La Suisse, Société d’Assurances sur la Vie, 293 F. Supp. 2d 397, 402 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 81. See Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. v. St.-Gobain Tech. Fabrics Can. Ltd., 474 F. Supp. 
2d 1075, 1081–82 (D. Minn. 2007). 
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Any and all claims, controversies, and causes of action arising out of 
or [1] relating to this Agreement, whether sounding in contract, 
tort, or statute, shall be [2] governed by the [3] substantive and 
procedural laws of the State of New York, [4] without giving effect 
to any conflict-of-laws or other rule that would result in the 
application of the laws of a different jurisdiction.  [5] The United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods shall not apply to this Agreement.82 
This clause specifically identifies each possible escape hatch and 
slams it shut.  In so doing, it ensures that New York law will govern all 
aspects of the parties’ relationship.  By way of comparison, consider 
the following simple clause: 
This contract shall be interpreted in accordance with the laws of the 
State of New York. 
The language of this simple clause does not allow a judge to 
determine whether the escape hatches referenced above are open or 
closed.  To the extent the clause presents interpretive questions that 
the parties did not consider during their negotiations—and as to which 
there is not even “objective” evidence as to their intent—it exhibits the 
functional characteristics of a contractual black hole.83  A judge called 
on to interpret such a clause must determine whether to accept or reject 
one of the five interpretive arguments listed above with essentially no 
guidance from the text of the contract or from relevant evidence of context. 
In response to this challenge, the courts have developed canons of 
construction that assign a presumptive meaning to simple choice-of-law 
clauses.84  To create these interpretive rules, courts frequently engage in 
armchair empirical speculation as to what most contracting parties would 
probably want these clauses to mean.85  While this speculation may 
occasionally be informed by contextual evidence furnished by the 
parties, in many cases it will be driven by the judge’s assessment of how 
                                               
 82. The bracketed numbers identify the language in the clause that is responsive 
to each of the five numbered arguments set forth above. 
 83. See supra Part I.B. 
 84. See Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 320 (1990) 
(describing a canon as “a background presumption about the legal system that is used 
to resolve uncertainty in interpretation” and observing that “any interpretive norm 
that courts rely on to resolve ambiguity is a ‘canon’”). 
 85. See Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. 
L. REV. 1581, 1581–84 (2005); infra notes 162–164 and accompanying text. 
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a “rational businessperson” would want the clause to be interpreted.86  
This interpretive move, though entirely appropriate, raises an interesting 
question:  what rational businessperson would want lawyers to draft a 
choice-of-law clause riddled with escape hatches? 
1. International supply agreements 
In an attempt to ascertain how frequently choice-of-law clauses contain 
comprehensive language that seals each of the five escape hatches, we first 
reviewed a sample of 157 international supply agreements.  Each of these 
agreements was filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) between 2011 and 2015, and all but three involved at least one 
U.S. party.87  We chose to study international supply agreements for two 
reasons.  First, issues of choice of law are generally more salient in 
international transactions than in purely domestic exchanges.88  
Accordingly, choice-of-law clauses in international contracts are more 
likely to be closely scrutinized than those in their domestic counterparts.  
Second, in some cases, a federal treaty—the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)—
will supply the governing law for international supply agreements.89  This 
treaty does not apply to contracts for the sale of good domestically.90  In 
selecting international supply agreements, therefore, we were able to 
evaluate whether the parties to such agreements regularly address the 
potential applicability of a federal treaty by drafting a provision that 
excludes it or chooses it as a source of governing law. 
 
 
                                               
 86. Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court, 834 P.2d 1148, 1154 (Cal. 1992) (deploying 
“rational businessperson” standard to interpret a simple choice-of-law clause); see also 
Panthera Rail Car LLC v. Kasgro Rail Corp., 985 F. Supp. 2d 677, 694 (W.D. Pa. 2013). 
 87. A complete account of how we went about gathering these agreements is set 
forth in the Appendices. 
 88. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 
(1985) (“[A] strong presumption in favor of enforcement of freely negotiated 
contractual choice-of-forum provisions . . . applies with special force in the field of 
international commerce”). 
 89. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 90. UNITED NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE, EXPLANATORY NOTE BY THE 
UNCITRAL SECRETARIAT ON THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 34 (2010) (providing that the treaty applies to “parties 
whose places of business are in different states and either both of those states are contracting 
states or the rules of private international law lead to the law of contracting state”). 
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After collecting the 157 international supply agreements, we coded the 
choice-of-law clauses in each agreement for language that specifically addressed 
one of the five escape hatches.  The results are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1:  Choice-of-Law Clauses in International Supply Agreements, 
2011–2015 
ISSUE PERCENTAGE OF CONTRACTS 
SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSING 
ESCAPE HATCH 
Does the clause select a law to 
“govern” the contract? 
90% 
Does the clause exclude the 
conflict-of-laws rules of the 
chosen jurisdiction? 
77% 
Does the clause address the 
potential applicability of the 
CISG? 
41% 
Does the clause distinguish 
between substantive and 
procedural law? 
24% 
Does the clause address the 
question of whether it applies 
to tort and statutory claims that 
are related to the contract? 
20% 
 
Approximately ninety percent of the contracts stated that the contract 
would be “governed by” the law of the chosen jurisdiction.91  This 
formulation effectively forecloses the argument that the parties 
intended to choose the law of one jurisdiction to “interpret” their 
agreement and to choose the law of another jurisdiction to “govern” that 
same agreement.  In addition, approximately seventy-seven percent of 
the agreements contained a clause directing the courts not to apply 
the conflict-of-laws rules of the chosen jurisdiction.92  This formulation 
effectively forecloses the argument that the parties intended to select 
a body of law that could bounce them out of the jurisdiction named in 
                                               
 91. See John F. Coyle & Christopher R. Drahozal, An Empirical Study of Dispute 
Resolution Clauses in International Supply Contracts 11 (forthcoming 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3206695. 
 92. Id. at 11–12. 
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the clause to still another jurisdiction.  These findings suggest that a 
significant number of contract drafters are aware of these two escape 
hatches and regularly take steps to seal them shut. 
The other three escape hatches, by contrast, are frequently left 
unattended.  Only forty-one percent of the clauses referenced the CISG 
despite the treaty’s salience to international supply agreements.93  Only 
twenty-four percent of the clauses confronted the question of whether 
the clause selected the procedural law of the chosen jurisdiction.94  
And only twenty percent of the clauses considered the question of 
whether the chosen law applied to related tort and statutory claims as 
well as contract claims.95  On the one hand, the contracts’ failure to seal 
these escape hatches could indicate that most contracting parties view 
these issues as unimportant.  On the other hand, it could indicate that 
the parties are largely unaware of their existence. 
We believe that lack of awareness is the more likely explanation.  
Notwithstanding the importance of choice-of-law clauses to future 
disputes, a surprising number of U.S. lawyers conduct little research 
into the content of the law of the chosen jurisdiction.96  Each lawyer 
will typically want the law of his or her home jurisdiction to apply and 
will declare victory if this objective is achieved.97  There are, moreover, 
                                               
 93. Id. at 16–17. 
 94. Id. at 14. 
 95. Id. at 3. 
 96. See LEA BRILMAYER ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS:  CASES AND MATERIALS 698 (7th ed. 
2015) (“[S]urprisingly often, the parties do not even bother to research the chosen 
law before they include a clause selecting it.”); William J. Woodward, Jr., Contractual 
Choice of Law:  Legislative Choice in an Era of Party Autonomy, 54 SMU L. REV. 697, 762 
(2001) (“Even if a party receiving a form contract choosing the law of, say, Arkansas 
took the time to read the form, the odds are extremely remote that the recipient would 
expend resources to determine the meaning of the clause.”); see also E-mail from In-
House Counsel at U.S. Energy Company, to author (Mar. 3, 2016) (on file with 
American University Law Review) (“[I]n the ordinary course of commerce, where 
there are lots of contracts flying around all the time, and time/cost are always issues, 
it is not uncommon to agree to a choice of law without doing a detailed analysis of how 
that jurisdiction’s laws work for you or against you.”). 
 97. Michael Gruson, Governing Law Clauses in Commercial Agreements—New York’s 
Approach, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 323, 362–64 (1980); see also Shaffik Bhalloo, 
Jurisdictional Issues in Electronic Commerce Contracts:  A Canadian Perspective, 8 COMPUT. L. 
REV. & TECH. J. 225, 278 (2004) (discussing advantages to choosing the law of one’s 
home jurisdiction); E-mail from former General Counsel of Minnesota Company, to 
author (Aug. 22, 2016) (on file with American University Law Review) (“We were 
mindful of the choice-of-law clauses, and generally preferred to identify our home state 
with which we were most comfortable, but that was generally the extent of our focus on 
that specific clause.”). 
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numerous cases in which one party succeeded in “winning” the choice-
of-law issue during the negotiations—the law selected was the law of its 
home jurisdiction—only to discover in litigation that an essential 
contract term was invalid under the law of the chosen jurisdiction.98  
When it comes to choosing a governing jurisdiction, in short, the 
prevailing view is that this choice is frequently “not based on any deep 
knowledge of this law, but rather on a vaguely felt preference for 
dealing with what appears to be familiar rather than with the 
unfamiliar.”99  With respect to the rest of the clause—everything except 
the choice of governing jurisdiction—the available evidence suggests 
that U.S. lawyers are even less mindful of the language they choose.100  
Accordingly, we believe that the most plausible explanation for the 
lack of attention paid to these is simple ignorance.  In such cases, it can 
be said that the parties neither had, nor behaved as if they had, any 
intention with regard to the meaning of the clause. 
2. Bond indentures 
Next, we reviewed a sample of 358 bond indentures to gauge how 
frequently choice-of-law clauses in these contracts contained one of the 
five escape hatches.101  Each of these agreements was filed with the SEC 
in 2016.  After collecting these indentures, we coded the choice-of-law 
clauses in each agreement for language that specifically addressed one 
of the five escape hatches.  The results are presented in Table 2. 
 
  
                                               
 98. See, e.g., Mail Boxes Etc. USA, Inc. v. Considine, No. C98-1472L, 1999 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 23380, at *2–4 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 13, 1999), aff’d, No. 99-35901, 2000 WL 964614 
(9th Cir. July 11, 2000); Novak v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 28 P.3d 1033, 1039–40 (Kan. 
Ct. App. 2001); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) ON CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187, Reporter’s 
Note (AM. LAW INST. 1971). 
 99. Gruson, supra note 97, at 325. 
 100. See infra notes 204–211 and accompanying text (discussing interviews conducted 
by Coyle in which lawyers evidenced little knowledge as to the significance of small 
differences in language in choice-of-law clauses). 
 101. A complete account of how we went about gathering these agreements is set 
forth in Appendix B. 
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Table 2:  Choice-of-Law Clauses in Bond Indentures, 2016 
ISSUE PERCENTAGE OF CONTRACTS 
SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSING 
ESCAPE HATCH 
Does the clause select a law to 
“govern” the contract? 
83% 
Does the clause exclude the 
conflict-of-laws rules of the 
chosen jurisdiction? 
55% 
Does the clause address the 
potential applicability of the 
CISG? 
N/A 
Does the clause address the 
question of whether it applies to 
tort and statutory claims that 
are related to the contract? 
12% 
Does the clause distinguish 




Here, again, the escape hatches are sealed much less frequently than 
one might expect.  There is no rational reason to leave the scope of the 
clause unclear, for example, and yet eighty-eight percent of the clauses 
did precisely that. If this is a conscious drafting choice, then one is left 
scratching one’s head as to why a fully informed drafter would ever choose 
to make it.  If it is not a conscious drafting choice, then one must accept 
that the differences between these clauses are random and inadvertent. 
Interviews with lawyers who regularly draft bond indentures suggest 
that these differences in language are inadvertent.102  These attorneys 
explained that no bond indenture is ever drafted from scratch.103  The 
deal always begins with an existing indenture from a past deal, which 
                                               
 102. See John F. Coyle, Choice-of-Law Clauses in U.S. Bond Indentures, 13 CAP. MKTS. 
L.J. 152, 163–65 (2018) (noting the ancillary language is viewed as unimportant and 
“virtually never discussed or negotiated”). 
 103. Telephone Interview with Partner, AmLaw30 Law Firm (Oct. 13, 2017) (“A lot 
of the indentures that we draft are based on precedent that we find filed with the 
SEC.”); Telephone Interview with Partner, NC Law Firm (Oct. 10, 2017) (“I’ve never 
started drafting from scratch.”). 
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is then modified to suit the needs of the present deal.104  With respect 
to the choice-of-law clause, the underwriters always want the contract 
to be governed by New York law because this is what investors expect 
to see and this will make it easier for the underwriter to sell the bonds.105 
The underwriters are, however, largely indifferent to the rest of the 
language in the clause because potential buyers generally do not care 
about this language.  As one attorney put it:  “The underwriter is not 
looking out for or protecting investors.  The underwriter is just trying 
to make sure the terms aren’t so offensive that the buyer isn’t going to 
want it.  If the issuer wants to change the language in the choice-of-law 
clause, no one cares.  All they care about is that you get New York law.”106  
As another attorney explained in an e-mail: 
In my experience, the indenture was drafted based on an agreed-
upon precedent, and neither side wanted to be the one to make 
“unnecessary” changes to non-substantive provisions.  You tried to 
keep your redlining to the most important points only, so that you 
had the highest chance of winning the points you really wanted—
not wasting points on a non-substantive provision.107 
Since the choice-of-law clause in a bond indenture is generally viewed 
as non-substantive, it rarely attracts the attention of the lawyers 
negotiating these agreements.  As a result, choice-of-law clauses are 
routinely cut and pasted from one agreement to another without 
alteration.  When this occurs, the lawyers may be unaware that they are 
using version “A” of a clause rather than versions “B,” “C,” and so forth.  
When disputes arise as to the meaning of these clauses, a textually minded 
judge may interpret these versions differently, on the assumption that 
differences in language must mean something.  In practice, however, the 
                                               
 104. Telephone Interview with Partner, AmLaw10 Law Firm (Oct. 10, 2017) (“For 
a first time issuer, the investment banks will look at a few comps in the relevant 
industry.  They say that they’re going to model these notes on a company that did a 
deal six months ago in your space.”). 
 105. Telephone Interview with Partner, AmLaw15 Law Firm (Oct. 13, 2017) (“The 
bank is hired by the issuer but is trying to sell the bonds to the bondholders.”); see also 
Telephone Interview with Partner, AmLaw10 Law Firm (Oct. 10, 2017) (“The underwriters 
want to get the bonds sold because they want their percentage.  They’re negotiating what 
they would perceive to be market and where they would get pushback on accounts.”). 
 106. Telephone Interview with Partner, AmLaw25 Law Firm (Oct. 11, 2007); see also 
Telephone Interview with Partner, AmLaw40 Law Firm (Oct. 17, 2017) (“A lot of time in 
these indentures, the underwriters are really just selling the paper/notes issued under the 
indenture.  They’re not taking credit exposure and they’re not making sure the boilerplate 
is always up to snuff.”). 
 107. E-mail from NY Bond Attorney, to author (Oct. 26, 2017) (on file with Authors). 
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parties were likely wholly unaware of—and indifferent to—the significance 
of the words that they wrote into their choice-of-law clause.  They were just 
cutting and pasting from a prior agreement.108 
B.   Disputes About Arbitration Clauses 
If a contract does not specify the forum or dispute resolution method, 
future disputes will be resolved in court.  Because case-filing decisions 
are only weakly constrained by the rules governing jurisdiction, venue, 
and similar matters, the parties to such a contract cannot predict where 
litigation will occur.  Indeed, they may become embroiled in litigation 
in multiple jurisdictions, at dramatically increased cost.  Furthermore, 
the parties cannot assert much control over who decides their dispute; 
they will find themselves before a judge selected according to the rules 
of the relevant jurisdiction.  Theoretically, the parties can resolve such 
questions by agreement ex post.  But once a dispute has arisen, each 
party will have a preferred forum, and the cost of negotiating an 
agreement as to the forum may be prohibitive.109 
Arbitration is one alternative to this uncertainty.  Typically, an arbitration 
clause requires future disputes to be submitted to a neutral party, selected 
by the parties, and empowered to render a binding decision.110  Parties 
might prefer arbitration to litigation for many reasons.  A commonly 
cited reason is that arbitrators may have expertise that will allow for 
more accurate resolution of disputes.111  Whatever the reason for the 
choice, parties will often devote little time to negotiating the details.112  
                                               
 108. See Espresso Disposition Corp. v. Santana Sales & Mktg. Grp., Inc., 105 So. 3d 
592, 594–95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (discussing interpretive challenges presented 
when text from one agreement is “cut and pasted” into another). 
 109.  See Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Changing the Litigation Game:  An Ex Ante 
Perspective on Contractualized Procedures, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1475, 1483–85 (2013).  But see 
Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process:  The Problem with Contractarian Theories of 
Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485, 526–29 (2003) (critiquing overly sharp 
distinctions between ex ante and ex post agreements). 
 110. Cf. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 382 (2002). 
 111.  A desire for confidentiality and other considerations also may lead parties to 
prefer arbitration, just as competing considerations-such as the desire for robust 
appellate review-may lead them to favor litigation.  See Thomas J. Stipanowich & J. Ryan 
Lamare, Living With ADR:  Evolving Perceptions and Use of Mediation, Arbitration, and 
Conflict Management in Fortune 1000 Corporations, 19 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 16–18 (2014). 
 112.  See Donald I. Baker & Mark R. Stabile, Arbitration of Antitrust Claims:  
Opportunities and Hazards for Corporate Counsel, 48 BUS. LAW. 395, 413 (1993) 
(contending that arbitration clauses are often included as an afterthought); Catherine 
A. Rogers, Fit and Function in Legal Ethics:  Developing a Code of Conduct for International 
Arbitration, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 341, 403–04 (2002) (“Often, arbitration agreements are 
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Occasionally, they will discuss basic details, such as the number and 
qualifications of arbitrators and the governing institutional rules, but 
they will often overlook important subjects.113  Consequently, if a dispute 
arises and the arbitration clause is not well-drafted, a party may try to 
exploit an ambiguity to avoid arbitration.  And neither party will be 
able to support its proffered interpretation by pointing to credible 
evidence of any shared intent. 
1. Preliminary skirmishes about the duty to arbitrate 
Fights over the obligation to arbitrate can take a number of forms.  
First, a party might try to avoid arbitration by alleging that no contract 
exists at all.114  As a matter of federal arbitration law, a party who makes 
such an allegation is almost certainly entitled to a judicial resolution 
before the party can be compelled to arbitrate.115 
More commonly, a party might concede that a contract exists but 
contest the enforceability of some or all of its terms.116  Such an 
argument will not always help avoid arbitration because challenges that 
implicate the validity of the entire contract—for instance, a party’s 
claim that its assent to the contract was induced by fraud—must 
themselves be arbitrated.117  However, courts must resolve challenges 
to the validity of the arbitration clause itself before requiring parties to 
arbitrate the merits of their dispute.118  Examples include the argument 
that a party’s assent to arbitrate was procured by fraud and the argument 
that the arbitration clause is unconscionable.119  Importantly, these are 
default rules.120  Most relevant here, the contract may require the 
                                               
an afterthought thrown into a contract by corporate attorneys who have little 
experience with arbitration . . . “). 
 113. Supra note 112. 
 114. See, e.g., Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 79–80 (finding that there was 
unambiguous assent to Terms of Service to arbitrate due in part to the terms’ 
conspicuous appearance). 
 115. See, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444 n.1 (2006). 
 116. See, e.g., Glass Design, Inc. v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., No. W-12-
cv-132, 2013 WL 12091106, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2013). 
 117. See, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 406–07 
(1967) (holding that claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract as a whole must 
be resolved in arbitration). 
 118. Id. at 403–04. 
 119. See Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 72 (2010) (ordering 
arbitration to decide whether the parties’ arbitration clause was unconscionable). 
 120. Infra notes 124–125 and accompanying text. 
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parties to arbitrate challenges to the arbitration clause itself, as long it 
provides “clear and unmistakable evidence” of this intent.121 
In another common challenge, a party concedes that an enforceable 
arbitration agreement exists but argues that its claims or defenses fall 
outside the scope of the clause.122  Again, the party will be entitled to 
make this argument to a judge, unless the contract clearly requires 
otherwise.  To succeed, the party will have to overcome yet another 
interpretive presumption, which is that “doubts concerning the scope 
of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”123  Put 
differently, courts “independently . . . resolve scope-related questions . . . 
by applying the ‘presumption of arbitrability.’”124  Yet, this “presumption 
of arbitrability” will not always lead a court to require arbitration, 
especially if the arbitration clause is not properly drafted.125 
To recap:  a party seeking to litigate rather than arbitrate the underlying 
merits of a dispute may (1) assert that no contract or arbitration clause exists, 
(2) dispute the enforceability of the arbitration clause itself, or (3) argue that 
its claims or defenses fall outside the scope of the clause.  Courts frequently 
encounter such challenges to arbitration, even when the contract 
memorializes a commercial transaction between business firms.126  However, 
the contract may require arbitration of the latter two challenges if it does so 
clearly and unmistakably.127  We will use the term “delegation clause” to 
describe a part of an arbitration clause that meets this standard.128 
                                               
 121. See, e.g., AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 
(1986); First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944–45 (1995). 
 122. For a discussion of the scope of arbitration clauses, see infra notes 134–136. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Schneider v. Thailand, 688 F.3d 68, 72 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Granite Rock 
Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 298 (2010)). 
 125. See infra notes 134–136. 
 126. See, e.g., Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 554 F.3d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 2009); Alamo 
Moving & Storage One Corp. v. Mayflower Transit LLC, 2002 WL 1973482, at *2 (5th 
Cir. July 31, 2002); W.L. Doggett LLC v. Paychex, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 3d 593, 598 (S.D. 
Tex. 2015); Glass Design, Inc. v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., No. W-12-cv-
132, 2013 WL 12091106, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2013); Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Jantran, Inc., 
906 F. Supp. 362, 366 (E.D. La. 1995). 
 127. This is a simplified summary, and we overlook some nuances not relevant here.  
For instance, it is not clear that every challenge to the enforceability of the arbitration 
clause can be sent to the arbitrator.  See, e.g., Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 
U.S. 63, 73 (2010) (requiring parties to arbitrate whether their arbitration clause was 
unconscionable, at least where there was no challenge to the clause delegating this 
question to the arbitrator). 
 128. See Douglas v. Regions Bank, 757 F.3d 460, 461 (5th Cir. 2014).  The term 
“arbitrability clause” is also used.  Societe Generale de Surveillance, S.A. v. Raytheon 
European Mgmt. & Sys. Co., 643 F.2d 863, 869 (1st Cir. 1981). 
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2. Drafting to avoid, or perhaps invite, a skirmish 
A properly drafted arbitration clause can prevent these kinds of 
preliminary skirmishes over the duty to arbitrate.  By contrast, a poorly 
drafted clause can invite parties to try to maneuver a dispute into litigation. 
For example, consider questions concerning the scope of the 
arbitration clause.  Parties can, without much effort, draft an 
arbitration clause that will oblige them to arbitrate essentially every 
dispute that might arise between them except, as noted above, for 
disputes about whether the contract or the arbitration clause actually 
exists.  They need only describe their obligation to arbitrate using an 
off-the-rack formulation supplied by judicial decision, such as “we 
agree to arbitrate all disputes that arise out of or relate to this 
contract,” or “we agree to arbitrate all disputes that arise out of or in 
connection with this contract.”129  If they cannot be bothered to write 
such a clause themselves, they can download one of the model clauses 
supplied on the websites of prominent arbitration providers such as 
the American Arbitration Association.130 
After writing a properly broad arbitration clause, parties who have 
identified matters they do not want to arbitrate can include an express 
“carve out” for these matters.131  Common examples include requests 
for preliminary injunctive relief and claims of infringement of 
intellectual property rights.132  Thus, an arbitration clause might look 
something like the following: 
Any dispute arising out of or relating to this agreement, except a 
dispute involving infringement of Third Party intellectual property 
rights or any intellectual property rights owned or controlled by a 
party, shall be submitted to arbitration . . . .133 
                                               
 129. See, e.g., Oracle Am., Inc. v. Myriad Grp. A.G., 724 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 
2013); Terminix Int’l Co., LP v. Palmer Ranch Ltd. P’ship, 432 F.3d 1327, 1329 n.1 
(11th Cir. 2005). 
 130. See, e.g., AMERICAN ARB. ASS’N, Drafting Dispute Resolution Clauses:  A Practical Guide 10 
(2013), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/Drafting%20Dispute 
%20Resolution%20Clauses%20A%20Practical%20Guide.pdf (providing two standard 
arbitration clauses, including possible alternatives or additions, which parties can adopt when 
contracting). 
 131. Drahozal & O’Hara O’Connor, supra note 18, at 1957. 
 132. See Weidemaier, supra note 40, at 1883. 
 133. See License, Development, Supply, and Distribution Agreement dated Dec. 11, 
2006 between Immunicon Corporation and Diagnostic Hybrids, Inc. ¶ 14 (on file with 
Authors).  Note that in the text above, we have added the words “arising out of or 
relating to this agreement” to make clear the broad nature of the clause. 
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The preceding example assumes the parties want to arbitrate 
everything but a discrete category of disputes.  Occasionally, however, 
parties will want to arbitrate only specific matters, such as sales quotas, 
valuation questions, and the like.134  Clauses that send a limited subset 
of disputes to arbitration are sometimes called “carve-ins.”135 
What makes no sense is for parties to write a seemingly broad 
arbitration clause but to use words that create an ambiguity as to 
whether the parties in fact intended to arbitrate only an undefined 
subset of disputes.  For example, some courts interpret a promise to 
arbitrate disputes “arising out of this contract” only to cover disputes 
relating to the interpretation or breach of the contract.136  Other 
courts, by contrast, interpret language like this more broadly, 
equivalent to language that includes the obligation to arbitrate claims 
“related to” the contract.137 
Parties who use arbitration clauses that refer exclusively to claims 
“arising out of” the contract—sometimes, perhaps unhelpfully, called 
“narrow” arbitration clauses—set themselves up for a post-dispute 
battle over whether the arbitration agreement applies to all or only 
                                               
 134. Clauses like this are often, but not always, considered “arbitration.”  Compare 
Evanston Ins. Co. v. Cogswell Props., LLC, 683 F.3d 684, 693–94 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(finding that the appraisal process did not constitute arbitration), and Salt Lake 
Tribune Publ’g Co. v. Mgmt. Planning, Inc., 390 F.3d 684, 691–92 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(same), with Fit Tech, Inc. v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., 374 F.3d 1, 8, 12 (1st 
Cir. 2004) (concluding that a clause providing for a “final determination” of certain 
valuation issues by an accounting firm constituted arbitration). 
  Federal law entitles parties to what amounts to an order of specific 
performance enforcing an arbitration agreement.  See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012); Necchi 
S.p.A. v. Necchi Sewing Mach. Sales Corp., 348 F.2d 693, 696–97 (2d Cir. 1965).  That 
remedy may or may not be available when the clause does not qualify as arbitration 
under federal or state law.  See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7601 (MCKINNEY 2010) (providing 
for specific performance of an agreement to submit to a valuation, appraisal, or similar 
process, “as if it were an arbitration agreement”). 
 135. See Drahozal & O’Hara O’Connor, supra note 18, at 1950. 
 136. See, e.g., Vemco, Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., No. 94-1016, 94-1506, 1996 WL 506495, at 
*3–4 (6th Cir. Sept. 5, 1996) (interpreting “arising out of” not to require arbitration 
of all disputes between the parties); Mediterranean Enters., Inc. v. Ssangyong Corp., 
708 F.2d 1458, 1464 (9th Cir. 1983) (interpreting “arising hereunder” to disputes 
relating to contract performance or interpretation); B.C. Rogers Poultry, Inc. v. 
Wedgeworth, 911 So. 2d 483, 488 (Miss. 2005) (interpreting clause requiring 
arbitration of disputes “arising under” the contract narrowly). 
 137. See, e.g., S.A. Mineracao da Trindade-Samitri v. Utah Int’l, Inc., 745 F.2d 190, 
195 (2d Cir. 1984) (interpreting the phrase “any question or dispute arising or 
occurring under” the contract to include claims for fraudulent inducement). 
2018] INTERPRETING CONTRACTS WITHOUT CONTEXT 1699 
 
some issues.138  Because disputes typically can be analyzed under 
multiple legal theories, a narrow arbitration clause invites parties to 
frame a dispute in ways that arguably bring it outside the scope of the 
clause.  Given the minimal time parties typically invest in negotiating 
the clause, there will often be no traditional contextual clues as to how 
they intended to handle such disputes. 
Another way parties can avoid litigating questions concerning their 
obligation to arbitrate is to include a delegation clause in the contract.  
Recall that challenges to the enforceability or scope of the arbitration 
clause are only presumptively for judicial resolution.139  A delegation 
clause “clearly and unmistakably” evidences the intent to reverse this 
presumption. But many delegation clauses arguably do not satisfy this 
standard.  An example is a clause that does not expressly delegate these 
questions to the arbitrator but incorporates institutional arbitration 
rules that do (at least arguably) make the delegation.  For instance, an 
agreement to arbitrate pursuant to the AAA’s Commercial Arbitration 
Rules incorporates Rule R-7, which provides: 
The arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own 
jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, 
scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement or to the arbitrability 
of any claim or counterclaim.140 
There are two potential problems with treating this as a delegation 
clause.  First, not all courts hold that incorporation by reference 
satisfies the “clear and unmistakable” standard.  Most federal courts 
would treat this as sufficiently clear, but some federal and a number of 
state courts have held to the contrary.141  Given the prominence of 
                                               
 138. See Alan Scott Rau, Everything You Really Need to Know About “Separability” in 
Seventeen Simple Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 182, 207–08 (2003) (criticizing the 
“tedious” distinction between broad and narrow clauses as having “led federal courts 
into semantic exercises of such exquisite subtlety, avidly pursuing distinctions invisible 
to the naked eye”). 
 139. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 140. AMERICAN ARB. ASS’N, Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures R-
7(a) (2016), https://adr.org/sites/default/files/CommercialRules_Web.pdf. 
 141. For cases holding that incorporation by reference meets the “clear and 
unmistakable” standard, see, e.g., Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 554 F.3d 7, 11 (1st 
Cir. 2009) (citing AAA Rule R-7(a)); Fallo v. High-Tech Inst., 559 F.3d 874, 878 (8th 
Cir. 2009) (AAA rules); Terminix Int’l Co., LP v. Palmer Ranch Ltd. P’ship, 432 F.3d 
1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2005) (AAA rules); Shaw Grp. Inc. v. Triplefine Int’l Corp., 322 
F.3d 115, 124–25 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that incorporation of ICC rules evidenced 
intent to arbitrate questions of arbitrability).  But see e.g., Ajamian v. CantorC02e, L.P., 
137 Cal. Rptr. 3d 773, 790 (Ct. App. 2012) (AAA rules); Diesselhorst v. Munsey Bldg, 
L.L.L.P., No. Civ. AMD 04-3302, 2005 WL 327532, at *4 (D. Md. Feb. 9, 2005) (AAA 
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Delaware as a state of incorporation and the fact that commercial 
disputes often do not implicate federal law, contracting parties would 
often find themselves in state court for lack of diversity jurisdiction.142  
Second, while institutional rules like AAA Rule R-7 allow the arbitrator 
to decide questions related to the scope and enforceability of the 
arbitration clause, it is not clear that the rules confer exclusive  
decision-making authority.143  Thus, while not as problematic as a 
clause that is ambiguous as to whether the parties must arbitrate all 
merits-related claims, a contract that simply incorporates institutional 
rules creates another ambiguity:  may one party insist on litigating 
challenges to the scope or enforceability of the arbitration clause? 
3. The prevalence of problematic arbitration clauses 
The preceding discussion highlights two problematic arbitration 
clauses.  The first is a seemingly broad obligation to arbitrate, written 
in a way that leaves room for a party to argue that particular claims or 
defenses fall outside of the clause’s scope.  The second incorporates 
institutional arbitration rules without clearly specifying whether the 
parties in fact want to arbitrate disputes about the scope or 
enforceability of the arbitration clause. 
Both types of problematic clauses are endemic, even in contracts 
involving high stakes and sophisticated parties.  For evidence on the 
prevalence of these clauses, we draw on a hand-coded sample of 
material contracts attached as exhibits to corporate SEC filings 
between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2012.144  The sample and 
coding methods are described in detail elsewhere.145  Though material 
contracts are not representative of all contracts, the factors that make 
                                               
Rules); Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co. LP v. San Juan Basin Royalty Tr., 249 S.W.3d 34, 
41 (Tex. App. 2007) (AAA rules). 
 142. The Federal Arbitration Act does not create federal subject matter jurisdiction, 
see Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983), 
and the shared Delaware citizenship would defeat diversity jurisdiction. 
 143. The new Restatement of International Commercial Arbitration takes the view 
that institutional rules like AAA R-7 simply empower, but do not require, the arbitrator 
to decide this question.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 4-14 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2018). 
 144. See Weidemaier, supra note 40, at 1905–07.  Material contracts include, among 
others, those “not made in the ordinary course of business which is material to the 
registrant and is to be performed in whole or in part at or after the filing of the 
registration statement or report or was entered into not more than two years before 
such filing.”  17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(10)(i) (2017). 
 145. Weidemaier, supra note 40, at 1905–06. 
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them unrepresentative—high stakes, sophisticated parties—mean that 
the parties and their lawyers can more readily justify an investment in 
careful drafting.  If these contracts frequently include problematic 
clauses, others likely do too. The sample was drawn from the Electronic 
Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) database on 
Bloomberg Law and emphasizes commercial agreements, including 
manufacturing and supply agreements, distribution agreements, 
licensing and development agreements, and marketing and other 
services agreements.146 
With regard to the scope of arbitration, recall that careful parties will 
either (1) use an off-the-rack formulation held to require arbitration of 
all disputes, with or without an express carve-out for claims the parties 
wish to litigate, or (2) write a narrow clause that expressly defines the 
issues to be arbitrated.147  The problematic, so-called “narrow” clause 
aspires to require arbitration of all disputes but contains significant 
gaps.  Narrow clauses turn out to be quite common and appear in 
25.3% of the contracts with arbitration clauses in the sample.148  For 
example, consider the following clause: 
If any dispute between the parties arises under this Agreement, the 
parties shall use reasonable efforts to settle the dispute for at least 30 
days.  After that period, the dispute may be submitted for arbitration, 
and the arbitration will be conducted before an arbitration panel in 
accordance with the rules established by the American Arbitration 
Association.149 
This clause is an example of spectacularly, almost ostentatiously, bad 
drafting.  It expresses the obligation to arbitrate narrowly (“if any 
dispute . . . arises under this Agreement”), leaving ample room for ex 
post dispute about whether particular claims or defenses fall outside 
the scope of arbitration.  This error is overshadowed, however, by a 
                                               
 146. Id. 
 147. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 148. Weidemaier, supra note 40, at 1905–06.  After excluding contracts where 
redactions by the filing party made it impossible to identify the scope of arbitration, 
182 contracts with arbitration clauses remained.  Of these, forty-six defined the 
obligation to arbitrate narrowly, creating an ambiguity about what must be arbitrated.  
These counts exclude contracts with carve-ins.  See supra notes 134–135.  We exclude 
these contracts because the drafter of a carve-in tries to expressly define the issues that 
must be arbitrated or submitted to another form of binding, third-party alternative 
dispute resolution.  We cannot readily detect when a drafter makes a mistake in 
crafting this definition. 
 149. SRI/Surgical Express, Inc. & Cardinal Health 200, Inc., Annual Report (Form 
10-K), Ex. 10.31 (Supply and Co-Marketing Agreement) (Nov. 26, 2008). 
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much larger one:  the clause is arguably written to make the entire 
arbitration process voluntary (“may be submitted for arbitration”).  
Leaving aside this latter mistake, the clause is a good example of a so-
called “narrow” arbitration clause. No sensible party would 
intentionally create such an ambiguity. Yet such clauses appear in 
nearly one-quarter of the sample. 
Turning to delegation clauses—and ignoring, for now, the impact of 
incorporating institutional arbitration rules—fewer than one in ten 
arbitration clauses in the sample (7.6%) expressly delegate questions 
of scope or enforceability to the arbitrator.150  And while more than 
nine out of ten clauses (92.3%) incorporate institutional rules that at 
least allow the arbitrator to decide such challenges, the impact of these 
clauses is unclear for the reasons noted above.  In virtually every case, 
then, the parties cannot know whether questions of scope and 
enforceability must be arbitrated without litigating the question.  To a 
significant extent, the outcome will depend on where the litigation 
occurs, because, as noted previously, the rules of interpretation differ 
across jurisdictions.151  Because relatively few commercial agreements 
designate an exclusive forum for any judicial proceeding,152 the forum 
will likely be determined by a race to the courthouse.153 
III.    CONTRACT LAW OR CONTRACT LITIGATION? 
We now consider whether the problematic drafting practices 
described above have implications for how courts and other interpreters 
should approach questions of interpretation.  To frame that discussion, 
it may help to highlight some areas on which we agree—and 
occasionally disagree—with the literature on contractual “black holes.” 
First, the choice-of-law and arbitration clauses that we describe are not 
quite “black holes,” in the sense that Choi, Gulati, and Scott use that 
term.154  For them, a “black hole” clause is one that has been used for 
so long, and so reflexively, that it has been “emptied of any recoverable 
meaning.”155  They distinguish this from more traditional cases of 
                                               
 150. See Weidemaier, supra note 40, at 1920, 1929. 
 151. See supra Part II. 
 152. In the sample, only 39.7% of contracts include a forum selection clause.  Of these, 
73.2% expressly designate the forum as exclusive.  See Weidemaier, supra note 40, at 1917–
18.  Thus, only 29.1% of contracts in the sample designate an exclusive judicial forum. 
 153.  Courts faced with duplicative lawsuits often defer to the first-filed action.  See, 
e.g., Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197, 1202–03 (2d Cir. 1970). 
 154. Choi, Gulati, & Scott, supra note 4, at 3. 
 155. Id. 
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contractual ambiguity:  “Terms that are linguistically uncertain in the 
sense we use here are not ambiguous but rather are acontextual.  The 
term in question can apply to an infinitely wide spectrum of referents.”156 
While we accept this distinction, we do not assign much significance 
to it.  A party who alleges a breach of contract must, of course, prove 
that the contract includes the relevant promise.157  For its part, the 
party accused of breach is hardly likely to seek dismissal of the claim 
on the basis that literally no one has any idea what the clause means.  To 
make this argument is to hand over the horse’s reins to one’s adversary.  
Moreover, each party is likely to proffer some contextual evidence and 
to argue that this evidence supports its favored interpretation.158  Thus, 
however many meanings a clause is capable of bearing, the 
interpreter’s job is always to pick between particular meanings proffered 
by the parties, each ostensibly supported by contextual evidence. 
To be sure, the problematic choice-of-law and arbitration clauses 
share the important functional characteristics of contractual “black 
holes.”  First, text is an unreliable guide to meaning, for an interpreter 
cannot easily “distinguish between meaningful language and empty 
boilerplate.”159  Second, an inquiry into the subjective intent of the 
parties will likely prove fruitless.160  Third, many traditional types of 
objective evidence—such as trade usage—will be absent (or, if 
proffered, deemed unhelpful or unpersuasive).161 
What should courts do in such cases?  Perhaps they should begin by 
recognizing that, although often couched as an inquiry into the 
contracting parties’ intentions, interpretation often resembles nothing 
more than a guess as to what reasonable parties would want language 
to mean.  Indeed, courts sometimes make such guesses with no 
evidentiary record whatsoever.  For example, recall the presumption 
that parties do not want to arbitrate challenges to the enforceability or 
scope of their arbitration agreement, and therefore, must “clearly and 
                                               
 156. Id. at 9. 
 157. See, e.g., First Inv’rs Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 152 F.3d 162, 168–69 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 158. Even in litigation over the pari passu clause—perhaps the platonic ideal of a 
contractual black hole—each party argued in support of a particular interpretation of 
the clause, and each supported its argument by reference to some contextual evidence.  
Argentina, for example, argued that the clause had a customary usage and that market 
participants widely understood the clause only to forbid formal legal subordination of 
a subset of pari passu-ranking creditors.  See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Argentina, 699 F.3d 
246, 258 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 159. Choi, Gulati, & Scott, supra note 4, at 67. 
 160. Id. at 4–5. 
 161. See Ben-Shahar & Strahilevitz, supra note 15, at 1764. 
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unmistakably” signal their intent to do so.162  The Supreme Court 
explicitly justified this interpretive rule by engaging in armchair 
speculation about the salience of such matters during contract 
negotiations.163  We do not mean this critically; cases must be decided, 
after all.  But it is nevertheless true that much of interpretation involves 
armchair empirical speculation—what in a different context has been 
called “fireside induction.”164 
The problem raised by contractual “black holes” is that, in making this 
guess about the meaning of text, courts may endorse an interpretation 
that fundamentally upsets the allocation of risks represented by the 
contract.  As Choi, Gulati, and Scott put it: “[C]ourts may be persuaded 
to adopt an interpretation of the term at issue that is antithetical to the 
functioning of a market that relies on the standard contract to regulate 
the rights and duties of the participating parties.”165  The absence of 
relevant contextual evidence presumably increases this risk.166 
But no contract is entirely acontextual.  The discussion to follow 
identifies alternative types of evidence that might guide interpretation 
when more traditional forms of contextual evidence fail.  Each has 
flaws.  Indeed, as authors we do not entirely agree with one another 
about the value of each type of evidence.  But we agree that, in at least 
some cases, evidence of the sort we describe below can mitigate some 
of the more extreme risks imposed by contractual “black holes.” 
A.   Building a Better Armchair:  Making Better Guesses About Meaning 
If interpretation often involves at least some armchair speculation, 
it need not be completely uninformed.  Here, we discuss three 
additional types of evidence that might, in some subset of cases, 
minimize the chance that a court’s interpretation will come as a shock.  
                                               
 162. See supra notes 139–140 and accompanying text. 
 163. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995) (speculating 
that parties are not likely to focus on these matters); see also Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. 
of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 488 (1989) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (observing that it was “most unlikely that [the parties’] intent was in any 
way at variance with the purposes for which choice-of-law clauses are commonly written 
and the manner in which they are generally interpreted”). 
 164. See Paul E. Meehl, Law and the Fireside Inductions (with Postscript):  Some Reflections 
of a Clinical Psychologist, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 521, 522 (1989), reprinted in Paul E. Meehl, 
Selected Philosophical and Methodological Papers 440 (C.A. Anderson & K. Gunderson eds., 
1991) (defining “fireside inductions” as principles that are established through 
generalizations and commonsense observations of human behavior). 
 165. Choi, Gulati, & Scott, supra note 4, at 5. 
 166. Id. at 6. 
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In the next section, we explore why courts rarely, if ever, seem to take 
evidence of this sort into account. 
1. Evidence about how contracts are produced 
Contracts often share the characteristics of other products.167  Law 
firms and other producers construct “routines that are dedicated to 
the mass production of homogeneous goods.”168  From this perspective, 
what is unique about contract clauses of the sort we have described is 
that they are not homogeneous.  To the contrary, they exhibit 
differences both large and small, which may (or may not) have been 
intended to serve a function.  Moreover, because these differences are 
often not salient during negotiations, parties and their lawyers pay little 
attention to which version of the disputed clause appears in the 
template for their deal.169  If there is a later dispute about the meaning 
of a clause, what should courts do? 
Of particular concern is the scenario where one litigant seizes on a 
minor variation in a boilerplate provision to argue that the clause has 
an unexpected meaning.  As discussed above, parties routinely argue 
that the phrase “arising out of” has a very different meaning than the 
phrase “relating to” when litigating the meaning of arbitration and 
choice-of-law clauses.170  Arguably, this also is what happened in the pari 
passu litigation described earlier,171 where a holdout creditor seized on 
the use of the word “payment” to argue that the borrower had an 
obligation to pay all of its creditors ratably.172  Although there was 
seemingly no consensus view as to what the pari passu clause in fact 
meant, this interpretation came as a shock to participants in the 
sovereign debt markets.173 
Choi, Gulati, and Scott disagree with the result, and imply the 
evidence might have been different if the courts had been willing to 
consider “evidence of encrustation.”174  For example, they suggest courts 
might consider whether the clause has “been repeated by rote over 
                                               
 167. Weidemaier, supra note 40, at 1895–96. 
 168. Richman, supra note 33, at 82. 
 169. See supra note 112 and accompanying text; see also James Gibson, Vertical 
Boilerplate, 70 WASH & LEE L. REV. 161, 195–96 (2013) (explaining that non-lawyers 
consider boilerplate clauses to be less important than more salient features of the 
consumer transaction, and tend to ignore complex boilerplate altogether). 
 170. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 171. Capital Ltd. v. Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 172. Id. at 254–55; see Choi, Gulati, & Scott, supra note 4, at 26–28. 
 173. See Choi, Gulati, & Scott, supra note 4, at 19–20. 
 174. Contractual Arbitrage, supra note 9, at 20. 
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many years, without [being] tested in litigation,” and whether it has 
been “embedded in layers of legal jargon such that its intelligibility is 
substantially reduced.”175  To put the point a bit differently, Choi, Gulati, 
and Scott might say that courts should be receptive to testimony about 
how lawyers produce and select contracts of this sort.176 
Consider a case in which a party wants to introduce evidence (1) that 
there are multiple extant versions of a clause, (2) that lawyers typically 
select the contract template based on considerations of convenience 
and familiarity, and (3) that the parties to this transaction did not 
specifically negotiate over the text of the disputed clause.177  In such a 
case, courts should hesitate before assigning to the disputed version of 
the clause a meaning that other versions could not readily bear.  For 
perhaps obvious reasons, we would not favor this result if there were 
clear evidence that participants in the relevant market understand the 
different versions to mean different things.  But in the absence of such 
evidence, it seems reasonable for courts to begin with a presumption 
that clauses mean the same thing.178  This would not always help the 
court decide which meaning to embrace, but it would reduce the risk 
of outlier cases in which courts interpret a contract in unexpected ways 
based on little more than a minor textual deviation. 
For example, consider contracts that use a “narrow” rather than 
“broad” arbitration clause—i.e., one that requires arbitration of 
disputes “arising out of,” but not “related to” the contract.  Or take the 
analogous example of a choice-of-law clause that does not specify that 
                                               
 175. See Choi, Gulati, & Scott, supra note 4, at 68. 
 176. We are not suggesting that the lawyers who made the choice of this contract 
should testify, although we think such testimony might be relevant and need not always 
raise privilege concerns.  Functionally, the question is similar to one that might arise 
in a dispute over whether a letter of intent or other preliminary agreement represents 
a binding contract, despite the parties’ failure to execute a more complete agreement.  
Such cases often involve testimony about the importance of the terms omitted from 
the preliminary agreement.  Evidence that the terms are mere boilerplate—i.e., not 
typically the subject of negotiations—may be offered to characterize the preliminary 
agreement as a binding contract.  See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 
768, 795–96 (Tex. App. 1987); see also Hunneman Real Estate Corp. v. Norwood Realty, 
Inc., 765 N.E.2d 800, 803, 806 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (noting that a letter of intent 
envisioned the execution of a contract with “such additional terms as are normal” and 
that this phrase “smacks more of formality and legal boilerplate than a call for further 
negotiation of material terms”). 
 177. See, e.g., Anderson & Manns, supra note 35, at 84–86. 
 178. This approach derives support from lawyer interviews conducted by Coyle, in 
which several interviewees expressed surprise that some courts view minor variations 
in boilerplate language as significant.  See Coyle, supra note 72. 
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the choice extends to disputes “relating to” the agreement.  With some 
frequency, courts have interpreted such clauses to exclude a variety of 
merits-related disputes from the scope of the clause.179  At least in the 
choice-of-law context, however, there is evidence suggesting that most 
lawyers do not even consider the possibility that the clause would not 
apply to, say, tort claims.180  Many are unfamiliar with many of the 
choice-of-law nuances we described earlier.  Certainly they do not 
negotiate over matters such as whether to exclude tort but not contract 
claims from the choice-of-law clause.  If presented with credible 
evidence to this effect, a court should hesitate before assigning such 
importance to the omission of the words “related to” from the clause. 
This said, we are skeptical that evidence about how contracts are 
produced and selected, and how they have evolved over time, will prove 
very helpful in most interpretive disputes.  The problem is that courts 
cannot completely ignore language.  Even if parties select a template 
thoughtlessly, even if there is no contextual evidence as to meaning, and 
even if historical usage shows repeated contract evolution with no 
obvious motivation, courts cannot simply ignore the text.  Contract 
clauses can exhibit staggering variety.181  In our data, for instance, 
contracts with arbitration clauses devoted an average of 311 words to the 
clause, but the contracts ranged from a bare-bones clause of only 
nineteen words to a multi-page clause totaling 1671 words.182  We suspect 
that many of these clauses began with a borrowed template, which itself 
had evolved over time for reasons that are not obvious in hindsight.  
Even if a court has perfect knowledge of the history of a clause and its 
template, by what non-textual standard is the court to distinguish 
meaningless “encrustation” from functional language?  The answer cannot 
be that, in the encrustation case, neither party can articulate a sensible 
meaning for the contested language―for in that event, the case could be 
decided without any evidence at all.183  Nor can the answer be that the 
clause has been repeated, even revised, “without having been tested in 
litigation.”184  Leaving aside uncertainty over what constitutes a sufficient 
“test,” countless clauses would meet this description. 
                                               
 179. See Coyle & Drahozal, supra note 91, at 13–14. 
 180. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 181. See supra Part I.A (explaining how the “editorial churning” process creates a 
multiplicity of templates within firms). 
 182. Weidemaier, supra note 40, at 1933 n.339. 
 183. In such a case, no party could establish a prima facie case of breach of contract. 
 184. Choi, Gulati, & Scott, supra note 4, at 68. 
1708 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:1673 
 
2. Evidence that different clauses are priced differently 
Another potential way to mitigate the risk of interpretive error is to 
introduce pricing data showing that market participants do (or do not) 
assign different values to different versions of the disputed clause.185  
Here, however, we have even greater doubts.  To begin with, although 
many contracts and contract rights can be traded, most contracts are 
not traded in liquid secondary markets, which makes it next to 
impossible to find meaningful pricing data.186  Even for financial 
contracts where there is good pricing data, it will be hard to isolate the 
pricing implications of minor variation in language, and harder still to 
draw inferences even from valid pricing data.187 
Assume, for instance, that a party presents credible evidence that 
contracts with version A of a clause trade at a small premium to contracts 
with version B.  What is a court to make of this?  A sensible inference, it 
seems to us, is that market participants understand the clauses to mean 
different things, or at least believe that courts will enforce the clauses as 
if they mean different things.  But unless one party’s case depends on a 
finding that all versions of the clause mean the same thing, how does 
this help decide which meaning is correct?  To be sure, if version A has 
an established meaning, and the plaintiff’s case depends on version B 
meaning something different, then the absence of a price difference 
might provide useful information.  Arguably, this describes the pari 
passu litigation against Argentina.188  In that case, while the meaning 
of the “basic” pari passu clause was unclear, the plaintiff argued that 
the addition of language requiring equal treatment of “payment 
obligations” created a different clause.189  This argument would be 
(slightly) more plausible if supported by evidence that the market priced 
the clauses differently.  Likewise, it would become (slightly) less plausible 
if the evidence showed the lack of a price differential. 
Even when such pricing data exists, however, it will be relatively easy for 
parties to frame arguments in ways that minimize or even negate its impact.  
Assume, for instance, that the evidence showed a small pricing difference 
                                               
 185. Id. 
 186. See Weidemaier, supra note 40, at 1935. 
 187. If one accepts that minor variations in language can be meaningful, then 
presumably the best methodology would rely on machine coding of contracts that 
would attempt to control for all differences in the text―possibly a staggering number 
of variables. 
 188. See Choi, Gulati, & Scott, supra note 4, at 26–27. 
 189. See Decl. of Hal S. Scott, NML Capital Ltd. v. Argentina, No. 08-CV-6978 (TPG) 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2010). 
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between contracts with and without an Argentina-style pari passu clause.  
Although this might help establish a difference in meaning, the evidence 
becomes nearly (perhaps entirely) irrelevant when offered to prove a 
particular meaning.  To negate the impact, a party in Argentina’s position 
need only advance an interpretation that might plausibly be priced, but that 
would not produce its adversary’s desired result. 
3. Surveys and other evidence of market preference 
Another possibility is to present survey evidence about the preferred 
meaning of a clause among members of the relevant interpretive 
community (if this can be identified).  Unlike traditional evidence of 
trade usage, which is offered to establish a regularly observed practice in 
effect at the time of the contract,190 such a survey solicits information 
about what members of the relevant community think the clause should 
mean.  Consider, for example, a commercial contract for the sale of 
widgets.  A survey of buyers and sellers in the industry (and perhaps their 
attorneys, for clauses that are less salient during negotiations) could help 
identify majoritarian preferences as to what clause does or does not mean. 
Evidence of this sort might help even if a dispute involves a true 
contractual “black hole,” where the clause has escaped notice for many 
years. When finally asked, market participants may express firm views 
about the meaning of the clause.191  If there is something approaching 
consensus, it is fair to attribute this meaning to the parties, at least as a 
strong initial presumption.  In most cases, a court could do so without 
abandoning the pretense that “objective” evidence is a proxy for the 
parties’ actual, subjective intentions.  After all, if the unreflective use 
of a contract template signals anything at all about subjective intent, it 
is the intent not to differ from the norm.  In effect, such parties signal 
the intent to have the clause mean “whatever the relevant interpretive 
community thinks it means, whenever the question becomes 
relevant.”192  Indeed, even if survey data reveals no consensus as to what 
a clause means, there may be consensus as to what it does not mean, 
and this alone may be enough to resolve some cases. 
                                               
 190. BURTON, supra note 31, at 174. 
 191. See Contractual Arbitrage, supra note 9, at 6–7. 
 192. We refer to an “interpretive community” in recognition of the fact that 
interpretation is a socially embedded act. Those who share a “particular community’s 
set of beliefs, values, categories of thought, paradigms, practices, and purposes” will 
often agree on the answer to an interpretive question.  See Michael Robertson, Picking 
Positivism Apart:  Stanley Fish on Epistemology and Law, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 401, 408 (1999). 
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Omri Ben-Shahar and Lior Strahilevitz, for example, have argued 
for greater reliance on surveys in resolving interpretive disputes, 
especially but not only in the context of consumer contracts.193  In a 
related vein, one of us has previously argued that evidence as to a 
contract’s preferred meaning may be usefully obtained by conducting 
targeted interviews with the lawyers who routinely draft such agreements: 
In many cases, courts striving to develop efficient majoritarian 
default rules . . . will have limited insight into the true preferences 
of most contracting parties.  Each litigant will invariably argue that 
its reading of the contract language is the one that effectuates the 
preferences of most contract users and the court will have no easy 
way to determine which account is the correct one. What is needed 
are studies of practicing lawyers conducted outside the context of 
ongoing litigation that set forth their preferences when they are not 
constrained to advance a position that favors their client’s 
immediate interest. Such studies would provide useful data to courts 
as they go about deciding which interpretive rule to adopt in a 
particular case.194 
There are potential advantages to relying on survey and interview 
data rather than expert testimony to resolve interpretive disputes.195  As 
Ben-Shahar and Strahilevitz note, the standard method of proving 
trade usage effectively amounts to a survey with a sample size of one.196  
We would add that these surveys are infected by bias, as lawyers will not 
proffer the testimony of a witness with an unfavorable view.  Though 
not free from potential bias,197 methods that aggregate the views of the 
parties who use and consume contracts are likely to be more reliable 
than testimony proffered by a hired expert.198 
For example, courts have reached differing results on two important 
questions about the meaning of simple choice-of-law clauses.199  The 
                                               
 193. Ben-Shahar & Strahilevitz, supra note 15, at 1753. 
 194. Coyle, supra note 72, at 687. 
 195. Though less structured and often more expensive, interviews might have 
advantages where interpretive issues are more complex, require resolution of 
seemingly conflicting information, or where survey results leave gaps that more 
qualitative analysis could helpfully fill.  On differences, see generally, Margaret C. 
Harrell and Melissa A. Bradley, Data Collection Methods:  Semi-Structured Interviews and 
Focus Groups, RAND Nat’l Def. Res. Inst. (2009). 
 196. Ben-Shahar & Strahilevitz, supra note 15, at 1804 (explaining that a larger “n” 
reduces variance and increases the likelihood that the surveyed sample is representative). 
 197. Id. at 1773 (addressing critics of survey data and the belief that survey evidence 
is prone to bias because there is no sound consensus in survey methodology). 
 198. Id. at 1775. 
 199. See supra Part II. 
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first relates to the intended scope and to whether the clause applies to 
tort and other non-contractual claims.200  The second relates to whether 
a simple choice-of-law clause encompasses the statute of limitations of 
the chosen jurisdiction.201  Courts have attempted to fashion majoritarian 
default rules of interpretation, only to disagree on the appropriate 
rule.  The disagreement is not surprising, since courts generally rely 
on armchair speculation to divine majoritarian preference.202  Could 
survey or interview evidence have helped produce a consistent result? 
To begin to address this question, one of us (Coyle) solicited the 
views of practicing attorneys, using a combination of interviews and 
structured e-mail exchanges (eighty six in total), to gain a better 
understanding of how they interact with choice-of-law clauses.203  Recall 
that parties, through their lawyers, generally negotiate the basic choice 
of governing jurisdiction (often choosing the lawyer’s home state).204  
The interviews suggest that lawyers rarely pay any heed to other 
important aspects of the clause.  As one interviewee put it: “We go back 
and forth on the governing jurisdiction all the time but I [cannot] 
recall ever negotiating the language in the rest of the clause.”205  These 
interviews also revealed that attorneys do not always focus on the 
meaning of certain phrases that frequently appear in choice-of-law 
clauses; several interviewees misapprehended the purpose of the 
phrase “excluding conflict-of-laws principles” that is commonly found 
in these clauses.206  The interviewees were also frequently unaware of 
                                               
 200. See supra Part II. 
 201. See Coyle, supra note 72, at 688–91. 
 202. Paul Meehl famously (and without intending severe criticism) described the 
law as reliant on the “psychology of the fireside,” defined to mean “those expectations 
and principles . . . arising from some mixture of (1) personal anecdotal observations, 
(2) armchair speculation, (3) introspection, and (4) education in the received 
tradition of Western culture prior to the development of technical social science 
method.”  Meehl, supra note 164, at 522. 
 203. Coyle, supra note 72, at 709–12. 
 204. E-mail from former General Counsel of Minnesota Company, to author (Aug. 
22, 2016) (on file with Authors) (“We were mindful of the choice-of-law clauses, and 
generally preferred to identify our home state with which we were most comfortable, 
but that was generally the extent of our focus on that specific clause.”). 
 205. Interview with In-House Counsel I, U.S. Pharmaceutical Company in city, state 
(Feb. 24, 2017) (“When it comes to boilerplate, I see people negotiate indemnification, 
termination, insurance, survivability, and assignability all the time.  I never seen anyone 
negotiate the choice-of-law clause except for the governing jurisdiction.”). 
 206. See E-mail from Lawyer I, TX Law Firm, to authors (Nov. 17, 2016) (on file with 
Authors) (incorrectly suggesting that the phrase “excluding conflict-of-laws principles” 
addressed the question of whether the statute of limitations of the chosen jurisdiction 
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the ways in which choice-of-law clauses had been construed by the 
courts in their home jurisdiction.207  When asked to predict how these 
courts would interpret specific contract provisions, their guesses were 
frequently incorrect.208  Finally, with respect to clauses that addressed 
the applicability of the CISG, a number of interviewees were unaware 
of the treaty’s very existence.209  Others had heard of it but didn’t know 
exactly what it did.210  One interviewee confided that he had been 
excluding the CISG from his contracts for years without ever 
understanding what it was.211 
One inference to be drawn from these responses is that courts 
should be wary of assigning important differences in meaning to minor 
differences in language.  Lawyers who draft simple choice-of-law 
clauses do not appear to be crafty transaction cost minimizers―perhaps 
deliberately foregoing ex ante certainty in order to maximize their 
flexibility in litigation ex post.212  To the contrary, the interviews 
suggest that lawyers rely on simple choice-of-law clauses because they 
are generally unaware that the escape hatches discussed previously 
even exist.213  We doubt their clients are any better informed. 
Knowing that lawyers do not attend to the details of choice-of-law 
clauses, of course, does not help a court identify the rule they would 
prefer if they considered the question before the court.  But survey and 
interview data can also help here.  Even where lawyers admittedly pay 
little attention to the precise language in a clause, they may still have a 
strong preference as to what they want the clause to mean.  With regard 
to the scope question, for example, interviews suggest that most 
contracting parties would prefer an interpretive default rule 
stipulating that related tort and statutory claims are covered by simple 
                                               
would be applied); E-mail from Lawyer II, TX Law Firm, to authors (Nov. 17, 2016) 
(on file with Authors) (same); E-mail from Lawyer, TN In-House Counsel, to authors 
(Oct. 18, 2016) (on file with Authors) (same).  Some courts have also made this same 
mistake.  See Brill v. Regent Commc’ns, Inc., 12 N.E.3d 299, 305–08 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2014); OrbusNeich Med. Co. v. Boston Sci. Corp., 694 F. Supp. 2d 106, 113 (D. Mass 2010). 
 207. See Coyle, supra note 72, at 691. 
 208. See id. at 697. 
 209. Id. at 694–95. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Interview with NC Attorney (Feb. 13, 2015). 
 212. See George S. Geis, An Embedded Options Theory of Indefinite Contracts, 90 MINN. 
L. REV. 1664, 1680–82 (2006) (discussing concept of strategic ambiguity). 
 213. See Coyle, supra note 72, at 697–99. 
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choice-of-law clauses.214  The overwhelming majority of the attorneys 
to whom we posed this question—fifty-four out of fifty-seven—stated 
that they generally wanted their choice-of-law clauses to cover related 
tort and statutory claims.215  With regard to the statute of limitations 
question, our interviews suggest that most lawyers interpret even a 
simple clause to incorporate the limitations periods of the designated 
jurisdiction.  The majority of the attorneys to whom we posed the 
question—forty-five out of fifty—stated that this was their general 
preference.216  Such evidence could, at least in theory, prove useful to 
a court struggling to interpret a contract clause with little in the way of 
traditional contextual evidence to guide it. 
We do not want to overstate the benefits of surveys, interviews, and 
similar methods for aggregating the views of the parties (and, where 
appropriate, their agents).  Indeed, we are not of one mind about the 
benefits of survey data in resolving interpretive disputes.217  As  
                                               
 214. See, e.g., Cannon v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 917 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1051 (N.D. 
Cal. 2013) (outlining the California adopted choice-of-law default rule); Coyle, supra 
note 72, at 697. 
 215. See, e.g., E-mail from Lawyer, California Law Firm, to author (June 7, 2016) (on 
file with Author) (“At least when considering trade secret issues—my area of practice—
and without going into anything privileged, companies generally want a single, unified 
choice of law.”).  We are assuming (reasonably, we think) that the views of these 
attorneys are adequate proxies for the views of their clients, or that clients are happy 
to delegate such decisions to their lawyers. 
 216. Coyle, supra note 72, at 689–90. 
 217. As just one example, even a properly-designed survey must be administered to 
the relevant interpretive community, and identifying this community requires both 
empirical and normative judgments.  For example, consider the note and mortgage 
or deed of trust associated with a residential home loan.  The language of these 
instruments is potentially relevant to the borrower, the loan originator, various 
financial intermediaries, investors (who purchase securities backed by cash flows from 
borrowers’ loan payments), regulators, and various others.  Which of these should be 
surveyed, and what weight(s) should be given their respective views?  Any interpretive 
method necessitates judgments about such questions (although these judgments are 
often left implicit).  But the difficulty in answering these questions is one reason for 
caution against assigning excessive weight to survey data. 
 Surveys administered (or survey procedures negotiated) ex ante may avoid 
some of these problems, for in most cases the contracting parties will be entitled to 
define the relevant interpretive community for themselves.  But ex ante surveys may 
not be feasible.  Among other reasons, contract disputes typically require judgments 
about what language means in a specific context.  A meaningful survey, then, must 
formulate the question precisely.  Given the nearly infinite number of potential 
interpretive disputes, it will often be difficult or impossible to do this ex ante.  Finally, 
while parties might negotiate a survey process ex ante—leaving the specific question 
1714 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:1673 
 
Ben-Shahar and Strahilevitz acknowledge, survey methods have limits 
and potential biases,218 and the same is true of interviews and other less 
structured methods.  But we agree that courts should be receptive to 
some evidentiary proffers of survey and related data.  Likewise, and 
despite the caveats noted above, we think pricing data, and data about 
methods of contract production and selection, have their occasional 
uses as well.  We close, then, by considering this question:  why don’t 
courts consider this kind of evidence? 
B.   Contract Litigation, Not Contract Law 
In discussing the utility of survey data, Ben-Shahar and Strahilevitz 
take pains to justify their proposal as consistent with the law of 
contract.219  We understand why they felt obliged to do so, but are 
somewhat puzzled that it should be necessary.  To be sure, one might 
expect a party to lodge a hearsay objection to testimony based on  
out-of-court surveys and similar methods of identifying the preferences 
of third parties―though, as Ben-Shahar and Strahilevitz note, courts 
overrule these objections in other settings.220  But this is an evidentiary 
objection, not an objection founded on the law of contract. 
Hearsay objections aside, evidence of the sort discussed in Part II.A 
should be relevant and admissible on the question of the contract’s 
“reasonable” meaning.  Certainly, it is no less relevant than the 
testimony of individual participants in a trade.  And, as we noted 
previously, it is easy to justify consideration of survey data and similar 
evidence by invoking party intent.  Parties who (mistakenly) assume 
that contracts are standardized exhibit the intent to be just  
that:  standard.221  If other users of the same contract template share a 
preference as to what the disputed clause should mean, there is every 
reason to impute that preference to these parties. 
The interesting question is not whether survey evidence should be 
admissible in contract interpretation cases—it is why courts are so 
rarely asked to consider it.  The answer, it seems to us, has little to do 
with contract law and everything to do with the practice of litigating 
contract cases.  Put differently, modern contracts scholarship is 
                                               
to be designed ex post by the survey administrator—it is not clear why parties would 
prefer this method of resolving interpretive disputes to arbitration. 
 218. Ben-Shahar & Strahilevitz, supra note 15, at 1773. 
 219. Id. at. 1815–19. 
 220. Id. at 1815–16. 
 221. See Anna Gelpern, The Importance of Being Standard, European Cent. Bank 2016 Ann. 
Legal Dep’t Conf. Proc. (2017), https://papers.ssrn.co/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2963333. 
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increasingly comfortable with the idea that transactional lawyers often 
bear little resemblance to “medieval artisans . . . producing extensively 
hand-tailored wares.”222  Just as other producers, transactional lawyers 
develop routines that lead them to produce (relatively) homogeneous 
documents.223  Much modern contracts scholarship represents an 
effort to understand the implications of this method of production. 
But path dependence and adherence to routine are not 
characteristics limited to transactional lawyers.  Litigators also have 
routines.  And while litigators often proffer the testimony of individual 
witnesses to prove usage of trade, it is rare, in our experience, for them 
even to consider developing survey data.  A similar point can be made 
about why transactional lawyers do not build survey methods into their 
contracts ex ante, as a means of resolving future interpretive disputes.  
The reason is not that contract law as presently constituted seriously 
undermines the utility of such clauses.  It is simply that it is not done. 
We are speculating, of course.  We can point to no data on the 
frequency with which lawyers consider implementing survey methods 
to resolve existing or future disputes over the meaning of contract 
language.  But we also can see no plausible argument that contract law 
would forbid the use of evidence derived from these methods.  
Contract law already offers some tools for addressing contractual black 
holes and other clauses where traditional evidence of context is 
missing or unhelpful.  It may be that the problem, if there is one, is 
with legal practice instead. 
  
                                               
 222. Mark C. Suchman, The Contract as Social Artifact, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 91, 102 (2003). 
 223. See Richman, supra note 33, at 79–80. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A:  International Supply Agreements 
To collect the sample (n=157) of international supply agreements 
discussed in this Article, one of us (Coyle) worked with a team of 
research assistants.  Each research assistant was instructed to conduct 
a search for “supply /2 agreement” in the “Material Contracts” section 
of the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) 
system database maintained by the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC).  These searches were conducted through the 
LexisNexis portal and were limited to contracts filed with the SEC 
between January 1, 2011 and December 31, 2015.  This search resulted 
in 5549 hits.  A research assistant then reviewed each of these 
agreements to determine whether the contract at issue was an 
“international” supply agreement involving at least one U.S. party and 
one foreign counterparty.  Once this initial review was complete, we 
were left with 248 international supply agreements.  One of us (Coyle) 
then worked in collaboration with Christopher Drahozal—a professor 
at the University of Kansas School of Law—to remove (1) repeat 
contracts, (2) amendments to previous contracts, and (3) contracts 
that were formatted in a manner that made them unreadable.  Once 
this process was complete, we had 157 unique agreements.  This 
collection of 157 international supply agreements comprises the 
dataset that we analyze in Part II.A.1.  
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Appendix B:  Bond Indentures 
To collect the sample (n=358) of bond indentures discussed in this 
Article, one of us (Coyle) worked with a team of research assistants.  
Each research assistant was instructed to review Form S-3s filed with 
the EDGAR system database maintained by the SEC between January 
1, 2016 and December 31, 2016.  These searches were conducted 
through the Bloomberg Law homepage and initially resulted in 448 
hits.  After eliminating duplicates, we ultimately identified 358 form 
bond indentures attached as exhibits to the Form S-3s.  This collection 
of 358 bond indentures comprises the dataset that we analyze in Part 
II.A.2.  It should be emphasized that the indentures here analyzed are 
form indentures attached as exhibits to shelf registration filings and 
that the actual indentures ultimately negotiated between the issuer and 
the underwriters may in some cases differ from the forms.  That said, 
attorneys who regularly negotiate these agreements report that the 
choice-of-law clauses in the forms are rarely—if ever—revised as part 
of the negotiations with the underwriters.224  This means that the form 
choice-of-law clauses will be identical to the actual clauses in the 
overwhelming majority of cases. 
 
                                               
 224.  Supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
